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land adjoining a watercourse. The court acknowledged such rights are
usufructuary. Furthermore, title to the land under the stream is
indicative of riparian ownership. Using Connecticut law, the court
reaffirmed that ownership of the soil carries with it usufructuary
ownership of the above water.
The court then focused on
Pennsylvania law, which states when a non-navigable pond exists,
where the land under the water is owned by others, no riparian rights
attach to the property bordering on the water. An attempt to exercise
any such rights by invading the water constitutes a trespass.
Based upon the aforementioned law, the court held Peck had not
claimed title to any sub-aqueous land and the evidence indicated that
he held title only to the land abutting the high water mark of the
pond. Therefore, the court found Peck possessed no riparian rights.
Accordingly, the court dissolved the temporary injunction against
Edelman and enjoined Peck from any use or entry upon the pond
without the Edelman's consent.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
Queach Corp. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, No. 430078, 2000 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2283 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2000) (holding
amendments to town wetlands and watercourses regulations are
facially valid).
On July 29, 1999, the Inland Wetlands Commission
("Commission") adopted amendments to the Town of Branford's
Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Regulations ("Amendments").
Queach Corporation ("Queach"), which owned land adjacent to and
including a substantial area of wetlands, appealed the Amendments'
facial legality.
Queach contended the Amendments defined "regulated activity"
more broadly than, and in conflict with, the Connecticut General
Statutes. The Amendment definition specified as regulated a number
of activities within 100 feet of wetland or watercourse boundaries. The
Amendments also authorized the Commission to regulate such
activities within upland review areas or other non-wetland or nonwatercourse areas when the activities affect wetlands or watercourses.
The court cited to a Connecticut Supreme Court opinion that held
an administrative regulation was presumed valid unless it was
inconsistent with or beyond the authorizing statute. The court also
found legislative expression of a strong public policy, supported by
case law, emphasizing public interest to preserve and protect wetlands
and watercourses from unregulated uses. Therefore, the court broadly
construed the Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act ("Act") as
applying to activity that occurs outside of, but affects, wetlands areas.
The court explained the Amendments did not expand the Act, but
rather itemized specific activities that could be regulated under the
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statute. The court held the 100-foot buffer zone was reasonable in
view of the statute's purposes. The court also held the regulatory
powers that the Amendments granted the Commission were within the
broad powers case law bestowed on inland wetlands agencies. The
court rejected Queach's argument that the 100-foot buffer zone was
not supported by evidence in the record.
Queach contended the Connecticut Legislature's 1995 enactment
of state statutes that provided municipal agency regulations shall
"apply only to those activities which are likely to impact or affect an
inland wetlands area" limited the case law cited. The court disagreed,
stating legislative history indicated the statutes simply codified relevant
case law.
Queach also challenged the portion of the Amendments that
identified as a "significant activity" "any activity which causes a
substantial diminution of flow of a natural watercourse, or
groundwater levels of the regulated area." The court reasoned that an
activity causing a substantial diminution of flow of a natural
watercourse or of groundwater levels could plainly have an adverse
effect on the health of affected wetlands. Accordingly, the court held
this portion of the Amendments was also consistent with the supreme
court's broad construction of the Act.
Finally, Queach argued several other provisions of the
Amendments effectively required an applicant to submit alternatives to
the Commission, even if the proposed use of the property did not have
any effect or impact upon wetlands and watercourses. The court
stated the provisions applied only to applications to undertake
regulated activities. The court stated, under the purposes and policies
of the Act, the Commission may consider all relevant facts and
circumstances, including feasible and prudent alternatives to the
proposed regulated activity that would cause less or no environmental
impact to wetlands or watercourses. Thus, the court concluded the
required listing of alternatives was reasonable and consistent with the
Commission's broad legislative mandate. Therefore, the court held
the Amendments were facially valid.
Kathryn S. Kanda
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Barley v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 766 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding a constitutional amendment ("Amendment 5"), which
required polluters to pay for water pollution abatement, did not make
it unconstitutional to tax non-polluter property owners under the
Everglades Forever Act because Amendment 5 lacked enabling
legislation, and thus could not be implemented).

